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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
N- 08-CV-4119 (JFB) (WDW)
Pa u l  Ca s s e u s ,
Plaintiff,
VERSUS
Ve r i z o n  Ne w  Yo r k , In c .,
Defendant.
M E M O RA N D UM  AND ORDER
July 9, 2010
Jo seph  F. Bia n c o , District Judge:
Plaintiff Paul Casseus (“Casseus” or 
“plaintiff’) brings this case against his former 
employer, Verizon New York, Inc. (“Verizon” 
or “defendant”) alleging violations of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act, the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act, and the New York State 
Human Rights Law. In November 2006, 
while employed with Verizon, Casseus 
requested leave to treat ulcers and wounds on 
his feet and ankles that resulted from sickle 
cell anemia. Verizon granted the leave but 
subsequently obtained video footage of 
Casseus engaging in activities during his leave 
that, it claims, were inconsistent with 
representations Casseus and his doctor made 
regarding Casseus’s health status. After 
reviewing the video, Verizon told Casseus,
J.O. VjUVEKINIVlEI'.
IN F O R M A T IO N
who was still on leave, that if  he did not return 
to work he would face “separation from 
payroll.” Ultimately, Verizon fired Casseus 
based on his alleged misrepresentation of 
health status.
Before the Court are the parties’ cross­
motions for summary judgment. As set forth 
below, the Court denies plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment in its entirety and grants 
defendant’s motion in part and denies it in 
part. First, plaintiff alleges that Verizon 
interfered with his rights under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and retaliated 
against him for exercising those rights. 
Verizon argues that it is entitled to summary 
judgment on plaintiff’s FMLA claims because 
it honestly believed that plaintiff had 
misrepresented his health status. After 
reviewing the record, and construing the
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evidence in the light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment under the 
summary judgment standard, the Court 
concludes that there are genuine issues of fact 
that preclude summary judgment for either 
side on the FMLA claims.
Second, plaintiff alleges that Verizon 
discriminated against him on the basis of race 
in violation o f Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and the New York State Human Rights 
Law (“NYSHRL”). However, no reasonable 
jury would find that plaintiff has established 
even a prima facie case o f racial 
discrimination. To the extent that plaintiff 
makes new allegations in a memorandum of 
law on the pending motions regarding racial 
discrimination, the Court rejects those 
allegations as procedurally and substantively 
defective. Accordingly, the Court grants 
defendant summary judgment on the race 
discrimination claims.
Third, plaintiff brings a claim for disability 
discrimination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the NYSHRL. Plaintiff 
cannot establish a prima facie case of 
disability discrimination under the ADA 
because, even accepting his medical evidence 
as true and construing such evidence in the 
light most favorable to him, he cannot 
establish that the episodic manifestations of 
his sickle cell anemia substantially limit him 
in any major life activity within the meaning 
of the ADA under the particular circumstances 
of this case. Thus, the Court grants defendant 
summary judgment on the ADA claim and 
denies plaintiff summary judgment on that 
claim. However, the NYSHRL’s definition of 
disability is broader than the ADA’s, and a 
reasonable jury could find that plaintiff’s 
condition comes with that definition. 
Additionally, there are triable issues of fact on
the remaining elements o f plaintiff’s 
NY SHRL disability discrimination claim, and, 
therefore, the Court denies the cross-motions 
for summary judgment on this claim.
I. Ba ck gro un d
The following facts are taken from the 
parties’ depositions, declarations, exhibits, 
and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of 
facts.1
A. Casseus’s Employment
Casseus worked for Verizon as a customer 
service representative (“CSR”) from January 
2000 until June 2007. (Def.’s 56.1 11 1, 37.) 
CSRs sit at a work station and, while wearing 
a headset, answer calls from customers. (Id. 1 
2.) Casseus concedes that his job was 
primarily sedentary but also claims that he had 
to walk away from his desk and travel up or 
down stairs so that he could attend meetings 
and training. (See id.; P l.’s Opp. 56.1 1 2.) At 
all relevant times, Casseus worked in 
Verizon’s Wantagh, New York facility. 
(Def.’s 56.1 1 1.)
B. Casseus’s Sickle Cell Anemia
For most of his life, Casseus has suffered 
from sickle cell anemia. One symptom of
1 Where one party’s Local Rule 56.1 statement is 
cited, the fact is not contested by the other party. 
Because both parties moved for summary 
judgment, four Local Rule 56.1 statements were 
submitted. Verizon’s statement in support of its 
motion will be cited as “Def.’s 56.1”; plaintiff’s 
statement in opposition to Verizon’s motion will 
be cited as “Pl.’s Opp. 56.1”; plaintiff’s statement 
in support of his motion will be cited as “Pl.’s 
56.1”; and Verizon’s opposition statement will be 
cited as “Def.’s Opp. 56.1.”
2
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Casseus’s sickle cell anemia is that Casseus 
periodically experiences “vascular crises” in 
which ulcers and wounds develop on his 
lower extremities. When these ulcers and 
wounds develop, they drain and emit a foul 
odor. Casseus and his doctors treat the 
wounds through “serial debridement” and 
“advanced wound therapy.” (See Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 
7-10.)2 Between 2000 and 2006, Casseus had 
two such vascular crises. (Rainsford Decl. ^ 
19.)
C. Casseus Requests Leave and Verizon 
Begins Surveillance
On November 27, 2006, Casseus told 
Eileen Capriotti, an Absence Administrator at 
the Wantagh facility, that he had to be absent 
from work because he was having trouble with 
his foot and ankle. (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 4.) Almost 
immediately, Capriotti notified John Scuteri, 
the supervisor of the Wantagh facility, of 
Casseus’s leave request and suggested that 
Verizon begin surveillance on Casseus. 
According to Capriotti, she requested 
surveillance because Casseus had taken leave 
during the same time of year in 2002, four 
years prior, and thus she suspected that 
Casseus could be fraudulently requesting 
leave. (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 10; Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 ^ 10.) 
Surveillance began on November 30, 2006. 
(See Brener Decl. Ex. N.)
Under Verizon policy, Casseus was 
required to submit to Verizon an “FMLA 
Certification Form.” (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 5.) The 
form is completed partially by the employee 
and partially by the employee’s treating
2 Defendant argues these facts are not material to 
the pending motions. (See Def.’s Opp. 56.1 ^  7­
10.) However, it submits no evidence to 
controvert these facts.
physician. (See Brener Decl. Ex. H.) Casseus 
and his treating physician, Dr. Alan Cantor, 
submitted an FMLA Certification Form on or 
about December 4, 2006. (See id.) The form 
stated that Casseus was suffering from 
“chronic and acute lower extremity-ankle-foot 
ulcerations wound infections due to sickle cell 
disease.” (Id.) The form also indicates that 
Casseus’s condition made him unable to 
perform at least one of the essential functions 
of his job and “closed shoe gear [was] not 
tolerated due [to] pressure on existing 
ulcerations [of] L and R ankles. Needs rest.” 
(Id.) Furthermore, the form states that
Casseus would be absent until approximately 
February 1, 2007. Both Casseus and Cantor 
signed the form. (Id.) Based on this
submission, Verizon granted Casseus FMLA 
leave for the period between November 27, 
2006 and February 1, 2007. (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 7.)
Sometime in December, Verizon officially 
approved Casseus for leave under the Family 
and Medical Leave Act. When it approved 
Verizon for FMLA leave, Verizon’s FMLA 
department had information in its records that 
Casseus suffered from sickle cell anemia and 
ankle ulcers. (See Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 11.) Verizon 
contends, however, that neither Capriotti, 
Scuteri, nor Joann Henke, a Verizon director 
and the official who, Verizon asserts, 
ultimately fired Casseus, were aware that 
Casseus had sickle cell anemia. (Def.’s Opp.
56.1 ^ 12.) Casseus’s leave was to run until 
February 1, 2007. (Pl’s 56.1 ^ 14.)
D. Doctor’s Certification
Verizon contracts with MetLife to 
administer its employees’ medical and 
disability leaves. (Def.’s 56.1 ^ 3 . )  On 
December 11, 2006, Casseus’s doctor, Dr. 
Cantor, faxed MetLife a form called the
3
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“Attending Physician[’]s Statement.” (Brener 
Decl. Ex. J.) The form indicates that Casseus 
was able to sit continuously and was able to 
stand and walk for one hour at a time. 
However, the form also indicates that Casseus 
was unable to “[t]wist/bend/stoop” or to 
“[o]perate a motor vehicle” and that, in the 
doctor’s opinion, Casseus was “totally 
disabled from performing any job, including 
but not limited to his/her current job.” (Def.’s 
Ex. J.) Casseus did not sign this document, 
and the parties dispute whether Casseus ever 
saw it or knew about its contents. (Def.’s 56.1 
1 9; Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 1 9.)
E. Capriotti Calls and Visits with Plaintiff
Verizon contacts employees who are out on 
leave. (Pl.’s 56.1 1 22; Def.’s Opp. 56.1 1 22.) 
During Casseus’s leave, Verizon officials, 
including Capriotti, called plaintiff on several 
occasions and made an unannounced visit to 
Casseus’s home on December 18, 2006. (Pl.’s
56.1 11 26-28; Def’s Opp. 56.1 1 27.) Verizon 
asserts that, during the phone calls with 
plaintiff, Verizon officials discussed with 
Casseus the possibility of him coming back to 
w o r k  w i t h  “ r e s t r i c t i o n s ” a n d  
“accommodations.”3 Plaintiff indicated he 
needed to speak to his doctor. (See Def.’s
56.1 1 15; Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 1 15; Brener Decl. 
Ex. E.)
F. Video Surveillance of Plaintiff
As noted above, Verizon had attempted to
3 (Def.’s 56.1 1 14; Pl.’s Opp. 56.1 1 14; Pl.’s 56.1 
1 28.) Although plaintiff makes an unresponsive 
denial in opposition to paragraph 14 of 
defendant’s Rule 56.1 statement, it appears, based 
on paragraph 28 of plaintiff’s own Rule 56.1 
statement, that there is no material dispute here.
conduct surveillance on Casseus beginning 
November 30. The surveillance team did not 
observe Casseus that day. Nor did it observe 
Casseus during approximately nine hours of 
surveillance o f his home on December 12. 
(See Brener Decl. Ex. N.)
On December 19, 2006, however, the 
surveillance team observed Casseus standing 
and walking in the parking lot in front o f his 
home for approximately 25 minutes. Casseus 
went back inside for a time and was then 
observed driving himself to two different 
banks over an approximately 45-minute 
period. At times, Casseus walked with a limp 
and sometimes carried a cane. (See id.) The 
surveillance team videotaped Casseus’s 
activities. (See id. Ex. O.)
The next day, the surveillance team 
observed Casseus walk out of his home using 
a cane. He got into a car with an unidentified 
female. With Casseus driving, the car went to 
a nearby Burger King drive through and then 
traveled to Darien, Connecticut. In Darien, 
Casseus stopped at a Mobil station and used 
the self-service gas pump to fuel the vehicle. 
The car then traveled to Clinton, Connecticut 
where it stopped at the Clinton Crossing 
Premium Outlets. There, Casseus got out of 
the car with his female companion and, with a 
noticeable limp, walked from the parking lot 
to the stores. (See Brener Decl. Exs. N; O.) 
Again, the surveillance team obtained video of 
Casseus’s activities. (See id. Ex. O.) At this 
point, the surveillance team lost sight of 
Casseus. When the team returned to the 
parking lot 13 minutes after Casseus had been 
seen entering the stores, Casseus’s car was 
gone. (See Brener Decl. Ex. N.)
At his deposition, Casseus testified that the 
video taken by the surveillance team fairly and
4
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accurately depicted his activities on December 
19 and 20, 2006. (See Pl.'s Dep. 143:1-5.)
G. MetLife Revokes Casseus's Disability 
Benefits
Subsequently, MetLife officials reviewed 
the video. On January 25, 2007, MetLife 
notified Casseus that based on the surveillance 
reports and video, “it appears that you are able 
to stand, walk, bend and drive for extended 
periods of time. Your Physician indicated that 
you were not to bend, stoop, lift, twist, bend, 
or drive. Although you were observed using 
your cane at times and did walk with a slight 
limp, it is apparent that you are able to 
function and perform the sedentary duties of 
your job.” (Brener Decl. Ex. Q.) 
Accordingly, MetLife denied plaintiff's 
disability claim, retroactive to December 19, 
2006. (See Def.'s 56.1 1 19.)
After Verizon learned that MetLife had 
denied plaintiff disability benefits, it ordered 
Casseus to return to work by January 29, 2007 
or face “separation from payroll.” (Def.'s
56.1 1 21.)4
H. Casseus's Return to Work
Casseus returned to work on January 29,
4 Paragraph 21 of plaintiff's opposition Rule 56.1 
statement denies the cited assertion. Plaintiff does 
not explain the denial but simply cites to an 
exhibit. However, the exhibit cited by plaintiff is 
the exact same letter defendant cites to support the 
assertion that plaintiff was ordered back to work. 
Thus, despite plaintiff's denial, there is no factual 
dispute regarding the fact that Verizon ordered 
plaintiff back to work after it learned MetLife had 
denied his disability benefits.
2007. (Def.'s 56.1 1 22; Pl.'s 56.1 1 41.) On 
or about that date, Casseus gave Capriotti a 
note from Dr. Cantor stating that Casseus's 
return to work was against the doctor's 
recommendation. (Pl.'s 56.1 1 41; Def.'s 
Opp. 56.1 1 41.) Casseus took numerous 
vacation days in February and later began 
educational leave, mostly to complete his 
master's degree but also so that he could 
properly take care of his ankle wounds and 
ulcers, which were still extant. (Pl.'s Dep. 
225:1-226:6; 228:4-15.)
Verizon subsequently prepared an 
“Investigative Report” on Casseus's FMLA 
leave. The report noted a finding by 
MetLife's medical director that the video 
surveillance demonstrated that Casseus was 
capable of performing his job. Furthermore, 
the report stated that Casseus had told Verizon 
investigators that he had performed the 
activities depicted on the video surveillance 
and had traveled to his wife's family's house 
in Connecticut. (See Brener Decl. Ex. P.)
I. The Third Party Medical Opinion
The Collective Bargaining Agreement 
between Verizon and the Communications 
Workers of America allows an employee to 
request a third-party medical opinion 
(“TMO”) when there is a difference of opinion 
between MetLife and an employee's 
physician. (Def.'s 56.1 1 27.) On March 5, 
2007, plaintiff requested a TMO through his 
union. (Id. 1 28.) A Verizon vendor selected 
Dr. Jay Abeles to examine Casseus. Abeles 
examined Casseus on March 29, 2007 and 
subsequently prepared a report. (Id. 1 29; Pl.'s 
Opp. 56.1 1 29; Pl.'s 56.1 1 44.)
The report was addressed to Ana Melo- 
Papadakis, an official in Verizon's Labor
5
Case 2:08-cv-04119-JFB-WDW Document 32 Filed 07/09/10 Page 6 of 27 PagelD #:
<pageID>
Relations Department. The report notes that 
plaintiff had ulcers on both ankles which were 
draining and had a foul odor. After reviewing 
medical records and the records of the 
surveillance on Casseus though, Dr. Abeles 
concluded that when Casseus was observed on 
December 19, 2006, he “should have been 
able to perform a sedentary job.” (Brener 
Decl. Ex. X.) As discussed infra, however, 
Dr. Abeles changed his opinion at his 
deposition in this case.
J. Verizon Terminates Casseus
Verizon’s disciplinary committee, which 
was made up of members of Verizon’s Labor 
Relations Department,5 along with Scuteri, the 
supervisor of the Wantagh facility, and Henke, 
the director, then reviewed the “Investigative 
Report” and the surveillance video. 
According to their deposition testimony, 
Scuteri and Henke were aware of Dr. Abeles’s 
recommendation but only the members of the 
Labor Relations Department had Abeles’s 
actual report on Casseus’s condition. Thus, 
according to Scuteri and Henke, they knew 
Dr. Abeles had found Casseus was able to 
work but did not know anything about 
Casseus’s underlying medical condition. (See 
Scuteri Dep. 55:8-12, 62:9-17, 67:1-7; Henke 
Dep. 24:20-25.) Ultimately, it was decided 
that Casseus should be fired. (See Henke Dep. 
14:13-23; Scuteri Dep. 52:20-23.) Capriotti 
and Scuteri met with Casseus on June 1, 2007 
and terminated him. (Def’s. 56.1^ 37.)6
5 (Henke Dep. 10:16-18.)
6 Although plaintiff’s opposition 56.1 statement 
denies this assertion with a conclusory, non­
responsive denial, he submits no evidence to 
controvert this fact.
K. Procedural History
Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action 
on October 8, 2008. After Verizon answered, 
the parties spent much of 2009 in discovery. 
In December 2009, the parties advised the 
Court that they each intended to move for 
summary judgment. Following a pre-motion 
conference on January 7, 2010, the parties 
filed cross motions for summary judgment on 
February 26, 2010. After the motions were 
fully submitted, the Court heard oral argument 
on June 23, 2010.
II. Sta n d a r d  of Review
The standards for summary judgment are 
well settled. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is 
appropriate only if  “the pleadings, the 
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and 
any affidavits show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Reiseck v. 
Universal Commc’ns o f Miami, Inc., 591 F.3d 
101, 104 (2d Cir. 2010). The moving party 
bears the burden of showing that he or she is 
entitled to summary judgment. See Huminski 
v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005). 
The court “is not to weigh the evidence but is 
instead required to view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing 
summary judgment, to draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of that party, and to 
eschew credibility assessments.” Amnesty 
Am. v. Town o f W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 
122 (2d Cir. 2004); see Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) 
(summary judgment is unwarranted if “the 
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could 
return a verdict for the nonmoving party”).
6
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Once the moving party has met its burden, 
the opposing party “‘must do more than 
simply show that there is some metaphysical 
doubt as to the material facts . . . . [T]he 
nonmoving party must come forward with 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial.'" Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 
F.3d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986) (emphasis 
in original)). As the Supreme Court stated in 
Anderson, “[i]f the evidence is merely 
colorable, or is not significantly probative, 
summary judgment may be granted.” 
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations 
omitted). Indeed, “the mere existence of some 
alleged factual dispute between the parties” 
alone will not defeat a properly supported 
motion for summary judgment. Id. at 247-48 
(emphasis in original). Thus, the nonmoving 
party may not rest upon mere conclusory 
allegations or denials but must set forth 
“‘concrete particulars’” showing that a trial is 
needed. R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart 
Co., 751 F.2d 69, 77 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting 
SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 
31, 33 (2d Cir. 1978)). Accordingly, it is 
insufficient for a party opposing summary 
judgment “ ‘merely to assert a conclusion 
without supplying supporting arguments or 
facts.’” BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. W.R. 
Grace & Co., 77 F.3d 603, 615 (2d Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Research Automation Corp., 585 
F.2d at 33).
The Second Circuit has provided additional 
guidance regarding summary judgment 
motions in discrimination cases:
We have sometimes noted that an 
extra measure of caution is merited in 
affirming summary judgment in a 
discrimination action because direct
evidence of discriminatory intent is 
rare and such intent often must be 
inferred from circumstantial evidence 
found in affidavits and depositions.
See, e.g. , Gallo v. Prudential 
ResidentialServs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 
(2d Cir. 1994). N onetheless, 
“summary judgment remains available 
for the dismissal of discrimination 
claims in cases lacking genuine issues 
of material fact.” McLee v. Chrysler 
Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 
1997); see also Abdu-Brisson v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“It is now beyond cavil 
that summary judgment may be 
appropriate even in the fact-intensive 
context of discrimination cases.”).
Schiano v. Quality Payroll Sys., 445 F.3d 597, 
603 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Holtz v. 
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 
2001)).
III. Discu ssion
Plaintiff alleges that (1) Verizon interfered 
with his rights under the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (“FMLA”) and retaliated against 
him for exercising those rights; (2) 
discriminated against him on the basis of race 
in violation of Title VII and the New York 
State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”); and 
(3) discriminated against him on the basis of 
disability in violation of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act and the NYSHRL. As set 
forth below, the Court denies both parties’ 
motions for summary judgment on the FMLA 
claims and the NYSHRL disability 
discrimination claim. However, the Court 
grants defendant summary judgment on the 
race discrimination claims and the ADA 
disability discrimination claim.
7
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A. FMLA Claim
The FMLA gives eligible employees an 
“entitlement” to twelve weeks of unpaid leave 
each year based on “a serious health condition 
that makes the employee unable to perform 
the functions of the position of such 
employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D); see 
also Sista v. CDCIxis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 
161, 174 (2d Cir. 2006). There are two ways 
in which an employer can violate the FMLA. 
First, it is unlawful for an employer to retaliate 
against an employee because the employee 
exercised his FMLA rights. Potenza v. City o f 
N.Y., 365 F.3d 165, 167-68 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Second, it is unlawful for an employer to 
“interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise 
of” an employee’s FMLA rights. 29 U.S.C. § 
2615(a)(1); see also DiGiovanna v. Beth 
Israel Med. Ctr., 651 F. Supp. 2d 193, 199 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009). Here, plaintiffbrings claims 
under both the “retaliation” and “interference” 
theories of FMLA liability.
1. Standard
(a) FMLA Retaliation Claims
With respect to FMLA retaliation claims, 
the burden-shifting approach originally set out 
by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), applies. See 
Potenza, 365 F.3d at 168. Thus, to state a 
prima facie case o f FMLA retaliation, the 
plaintiff must show that (1) he exercised rights 
protected under the FMLA; (2) he was 
qualified for his position; (3) he suffered an 
adverse employment action; and (4) the 
adverse employment action occurred under 
circumstances giving rise to an inference of 
retaliatory intent. Id. If the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, then the burden
of production shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate a legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reason for the adverse employment action. 
DiGiovanna, 651 F. Supp. 2d at 203. If the 
employer meets its burden of production, then 
the plaintiff must establish that the employer’s 
proffered reason was merely a pretext for a 
discriminatory reason. See id. at 203-04.
(b) FMLA Interference Claims
To state a prima facie case for interference 
with FMLA rights, the plaintiff must establish 
(1) that he is an eligible employee under the 
FMLA; (2) that defendant is an employer 
under the FMLA; (3) that he was entitled to 
FMLA leave; (4) that he gave notice to 
defendant of his intention to take leave; and 
(5) that the defendant denied or otherwise 
interfered with benefits to which the employee 
was entitled under the FMLA. See Garraway 
v. Solomon R. Guggenheim Found., 415 F. 
Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); accord 
Divers v. Metro. Jewish Health Sys., No. 06- 
CV-6704(RRM)(JMA), 2009 WL 103703, at 
*20 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2009). Interference 
with FMLA rights can include “‘not only 
refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but 
discouraging an employee from using such 
leave . . . .” Potenza, 365 F.3d at 167 (citing 
29 C.F.R. § 825.220(b)).
With respect to the interference claim, 
Verizon asserts that the claim cannot survive 
summary judgment because Verizon had a 
good faith belief that plaintiff misrepresented 
his health status which, it argues, provides a 
complete defense to an FMLA interference 
claim. (See Def.’s Mem. of Law at 23.) It is 
axiomatic that an interference claim can be 
defeated by showing that the employee did not 
take the leave for its intended purpose and 
thereby abused the leave. Such an employee
8
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is ineligible for leave under the FMLA. See 
Vail v. Raybestos Prods. Co., 533 F.3d 904, 
909 (7th Cir. 2008). Numerous courts have 
extended this rule to conclude that an 
employer’s honest belief that an employee is 
abusing FMLA leave defeats an FMLA claim, 
even if  that belief is mistaken. See, e.g., id. 
(Stating that, with respect to an FMLA 
interference claim, “an employer has not 
violated the FMLA if  it refused to reinstate the 
employee based on an ‘honest suspicion’ that 
she was abusing her leave” (citation omitted)); 
Medley v. Polk Co., 260 F.3d 1202, 1207 
(10th Cir. 2001) (“The law, from a number of 
authorities at both the federal appellate and 
d is tric t court levels, is, how ever, 
uncontradictedly being pronounced that an 
employer honestly believing that the employee 
has abandoned her job and is otherwise not 
using FMLA leave for its here ‘intended 
purpose’, to care for a parent, would not be in 
violation of [the] FMLA, even if  its 
conclusion is mistaken, since this would not 
be a discriminatory firing.” (footnote and 
citation omitted)); Reinwald v. The 
Huntington Nat’lBank, 684 F. Supp. 2d 975, 
984-85 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“The honest belief 
defense applies to both interference and 
retaliation claims brought under the FMLA.” 
(citations omitted)); Nelson v. Oshkosh Truck 
Corp, No. 07-C-509, 2008 WL 4379557, at 
*4 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2008) (“[I]n order to 
defeat an FMLA interference claim, the 
employer ‘need not conclusively prove that 
[the employee] had misused her leave; an 
honest suspicion will do.’” (quoting Kariotis 
v. NavistarInt’l Transp. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 
681 (7th Cir. 1997))); accord Jackson v. 
Jernberg Indus. Inc., 677 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 
1052 (N.D. Ill. 2010).
The Second Circuit has not addressed the 
“honest belief” defense in the context of 
FMLA interference claims and has not
decided whether the McDonnell-Douglas 
burden-shifting approach should be applied 
not only to FMLA retaliation claims, but also 
to FMLA interference claims. See Potenza, 
365 F.3d at 168 (discussing case authority 
from other circuits but declining to decide the 
issue); see also Sista, 445 F.3d at 176 (noting 
the issue identified in Potenza and concluding, 
without reference to the McDonnell-Douglas 
test, that summary judgment was warranted 
for employer on both FMLA interference and 
retaliation claims because there was no 
dispute that employer could fire plaintiff for 
threatening a supervisor and no evidence that 
the FMLA leave was a negative factor in 
decision to terminate plaintiff). However, in 
the context of this case, the Court will assume 
arguendo, as urged by defendant, that an 
employer can defeat an FMLA interference 
claim by establishing that it had a legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reason for its actions, even 
if  that reason was mistaken. As set forth 
below, however, there are disputed issues of 
fact that preclude summary judgment in either 
party’s favor on the FMLA interference and 
retaliation claims.
2. Application 
a. Defendant’s Motion
Verizon does not appear to seriously argue 
that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie 
case of FMLA interference or FMLA 
retaliation.7 In any event, based upon the
7 The only argument Verizon makes regarding a 
prima facie case on either FMLA theory is a 
footnote in its moving brief. The footnote asserts 
that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case 
on his FMLA retaliation claim because six months 
passed from the time plaintiff took leave until 
Verizon fired him, and this passage of time 
obviates any casual connection between the
9
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evidence discussed infra in connection with 
the ultimate issue, the Court concludes that 
plaintiff has established a prima facie case. 
The focus of Verizon’s argument on the 
FMLA claims is that Casseus misrepresented 
his health status, and, therefore, it had a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its 
actions regarding plaintiff. (See Def.’s Mem. 
of Law at 22-23.) However, viewing the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, there are genuine issues of disputed 
fact on the following issues that preclude 
summary judgment for the defendant: (1) 
whether defendant believed in good faith that 
plaintiff had misrepresented his health status 
in a material manner and, thus, abused the 
leave; (2) whether defendant interfered with 
plaintiff’s leave under FMLA by overly 
scrutinizing him while on leave and then 
seeking to terminate the leave based on a 
pretextual claim by that he had misrepresented
protected activity and the alleged retaliatory act. 
The Court disagrees. Although courts have 
dismissed retaliation claims where more than two 
to three months have passed between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment 
action, this not a hard and fast rule, and courts 
have found an inference of causation where more 
time passed. See, e.g., McGuire v. Warren, No. 
05 Civ. 02632 (DCP) (WCC), 2009 WL 3963941, 
at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2009) (finding that 
eight-month gap between protected activity and 
adverse employment action did not break casual 
connection and collecting cases); see also 
Richardson v. N.Y.S. D ep’t o f  Corr. Serv., 180 
F.3d 426, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1999), abrogated on 
other grounds, Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. 
v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (holding abusive acts 
within one month of receipt of deposition notices 
may be retaliation for initiation of lawsuit more 
than one year earlier). Moreover, as set forth 
more fully below, activity was occurring with 
respect to Casseus, his leave, and his health status 
throughout the entire period at issue.
his health status; and (3) whether Verizon 
claimed that plaintiff misrepresented his 
health status in terminating plaintiff as a 
pretext for retaliating against him for taking 
the FMLA leave.
Plaintiff relies on several different pieces 
of evidence in the record to raise genuine 
issues of fact on the FMLA interference and 
retaliation claims. First, plaintiff points to 
evidence that Capriotti (the Absence 
Administrator at the Wantagh facility) and 
Scuteri (the supervisor at the Wantagh 
facility) ordered surveillance— something they 
did relatively infrequently8 *— on plaintiff 
almost immediately after he submitted his 
leave request. Indeed, Verizon began 
surveillance on Casseus even before it had 
officially approved him for FMLA leave. 
Although Verizon asserts that it had detected 
a possible “pattern” of absence by plaintiff 
because plaintiff had requested leave during 
the same time of year four years before, a 
Verizon witness also indicated that a four-year 
gap is not typically indicative of a “pattern.” 
(See Keating Dep. 9:23-11:25.) Second, 
plaintiff notes that Capriotti made a series of 
calls to plaintiff early on in his absence and 
made an unannounced visit to plaintiff’s house 
before surveillance had revealed any basis for 
believing that plaintiff was abusing his leave. 
(See Brener Decl. Ex. E.) Third, even after he 
was ordered to return to work on January 29, 
2007, plaintiff gave Capriotti a note from his 
doctor, stating that Casseus’s return to work 
was against the doctor’s recommendation. 
Fourth, there is evidence that Capriotti, after 
plaintiff was ordered back to work, refused to
8 (See Capriotti Dep. 28:25-29:3 (speculating that
she “could have” requested surveillance 20 times 
in ten years).)
10
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meet with plaintiff to discuss modified 
working conditions. (See Pl.’s Dep. 169:10­
171:15.) Fifth, there is evidence that the 
Verizon officials involved in the decision to 
terminate Casseus gave at least somewhat 
inconsistent deposition testimony as to what 
exactly Casseus misrepresented about his 
health status.9 Finally, plaintiff asserts that, 
under Verizon policy, repeated disabilities of 
long duration where health prospects are poor 
constitute an unsatisfactory attendance record. 
(See Pl.’s 56.1 ^ 4.) In sum, there is sufficient 
evidence in the record, when viewed as a 
whole and in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff, to create genuine issues of disputed 
fact that preclude summary judgment on the 
FMLA interference and retaliation claims.
The Court has considered defendant’s 
arguments in support of its motion for 
summary judgment on the FMLA claims, but 
finds those arguments to be unpersuasive. 
First, although Verizon suggests that plaintiff 
admitted misrepresenting his health status, the 
Court disagrees. In making this contention, 
Verizon relies in part on the “Attending 
Physician’s Statement” form submitted by Dr. 
Cantor (see Brener Decl. Ex. J.) and on
9 (Compare Papadakis Dep. 93:23-94:2 (stating 
that “the two reasons” plaintiff was terminated 
were “driving” and “bending”) and id. 86:17-22 
(agreeing that plaintiff “was not fired for walking 
in the video” or “standing in the video”) with 
Henke Dep. 47:22-48:9 (stating that decision to 
fire Casseus was based on video of him “walking, 
standing, [and] driving to Connecticut” even 
though he claimed to be totally disabled); and 
Scuteri Dep. 58:24-59:1 (stating that he 
recommended plaintiff be terminated were 
because he could “walk” and “drive”); and id. 
66:25 (stating that he recommended plaintiff be 
terminated because plaintiff could “[s]tand, sit, 
and walk”).)
Casseus’s answers to questions about the form 
at his deposition. (See Def.’s Reply Mem. of 
Law at 5 n.8.) In filling out the form, Dr. 
Cantor indicated that plaintiff could sit 
“continuously” and could stand or walk for 
one to two hours at a time but could not 
“twist/bend/stoop,” “reach above shoulder 
level,” or “operate a motor vehicle.” (See id.) 
At plaintiff’s deposition, plaintiff agreed that 
he nonetheless drove, bent, and walked in the 
video. (Pl.’s Dep. 165:9-24.)
There is no evidence, however, that 
plaintiff knew in December 2006 what Dr. 
Cantor had said in the Attending Physician’s 
Statement. (See Pl.’s Dep. 123:20-23.)
Additionally, although plaintiff was seen 
walking in the video, the Attending 
Physician’s Statement appears to indicate that 
plaintiff was capable of walking for one to 
two hours at a time. In short, there is no 
evidence Casseus— as opposed to his 
doctor— stated that he was unable to drive or 
bend.10 Nor did plaintiff admit to Verizon 
investigators that he had misrepresented his 
health status. (Cf. Def.’s Reply Mem. of Law 
at 5.) In support of this assertion, defendant 
relies on language from a Verizon 
investigative report stating that “Casseus 
acknowledged he performed all of the 
activities that he was observed doing while 
surveillance was conducted on December 19,
10 Defendant similarly mischaracterizes other 
“admissions” by plaintiff. For example, defendant 
argues that, when plain tiff applied for 
unemployment benefits, he admitted that “he was 
terminated for ‘violating a section of the employee 
handbook regarding disability.’” (Def.’s Mem. of 
Law at 11-12.) However, when plaintiff made this 
statement, he was answering a question that asked 
“[w]hat reasons were you given by your employer 
for being fired?” Clearly, this is a different 
question than “why were you fired?”
11
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2006 and December 20, 2006. Casseus told 
Security that he went to his wife’s family 
house in Connecticut^] however he did not 
recall how long he was there.” (Brener Decl. 
Ex. P.) Viewed in a light most favorable to 
plaintiff, this statement simply acknowledges 
that he was the person seen on the video.11 In 
sum, the record contains no evidence that 
C asseus acknow ledged  fraudu len tly  
requesting leave; rather, the record reflects 
that Casseus, even after being ordered to 
return to work, maintained that his sickle cell 
anemia and ulcers made it difficult to get to 
work everyday and took vacation days to treat 
his wounds.12
Second, the medical evidence relied upon 
by Verizon does not compel summary 
judgment in its favor. In particular, to further 
support its argument that it had a good faith 
basis to terminate Casseus, Verizon relies on 
medical evidence that Casseus was able to 
perform his job despite his condition. (Def.’s 
Mem. of Law at 20; Def.’s Reply Mem. of
11 Notably, even with this “admission,” the 
report’s conclusion is that Casseus “may have 
violated” a section of Verizon’s Code of Conduct 
prohibiting misrepresentations of health status. 
(Brener Decl. Ex. P (emphasis added).)
12 (See Pl.’s Dep. 225:1-226:6; 228:4-15.) Thus, 
this case is factually distinguishable from Roge v. 
NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2001), 
which defendants rely heavily on to support the 
proposition that an employer may terminate an 
employee who the employer in good faith believes 
engaged in fraud. 257 F.3d at 169. In Roge, 
however, the employee initially submitted a 
doctor’s note stating that he was permanently 
disabled and then, after he became unhappy with 
his disability benefits, sought to have a doctor 
certify that he was able to work. This sequence of 
events was known to the employer. See 257 F.3d 
at 169.
Law at 5.) As a threshold matter, Verizon’s 
medical evidence directly conflicts with the 
note written by plaintiff’s doctor stating that 
plaintiff’s return to work was against doctor’s 
orders. Furthermore, the MetLife Medical 
Director’s conclusion appears to have been 
based solely on a review of the surveillance 
report and the surveillance video. (See Brener 
Decl. Ex. P.) Nothing in the record indicates 
that he knew of Casseus’s underlying medical 
condition or medical history. Nor did the 
medical director ever examine Casseus. There 
are also questions regarding the weight that 
should be attached to Dr. Abeles’s conclusion 
that plaintiff was able to work. For one, Dr. 
Abeles, a podiatrist, acknowledged at his 
deposition that, over a 20-year career, he had 
never treated anyone for sickle cell anemia, 
the condition suffered by plaintiff. (See 
Abeles Dep. 31:16-32:11.) Moreover, 
although Dr. Abeles concluded in 2007 that 
Casseus was able to perform his job, he 
changed his mind after researching sickle cell 
anemia during an overnight break in his 
deposition in this case. After researching 
sickle cell anemia, Abeles testified:
[I]n his case, because he is on that 
medication hyrdoxyurea, obviously 
being on that, which is an anti-cancer 
drug[,] for severe crisis. If he is 
suffering from severe crisis, that is 
going to effect his work, again, at 
different times, different places. You 
can’t really judge when he is going to 
have it. The surveillance, he could 
one minute be able to walk and do all 
activities and a couple of days later he 
could be hospitalized . . . . But 
obviously by being on that medication, 
he was pretty you know, he had pretty 
severe symptoms.
(Abeles Dep. 108:9-109:18.) Plaintiff’s
12
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counsel then asked Abeles if  he had
been asked the question back in 2007, 
not just can Mr. Casseus do his 
sedentary job, but can Mr. Casseus do 
all of these components that make up 
his workday and getting to and from 
his workday, would your opinion have 
been different, the same or can you 
comment now?
Abeles answered, “[b]ased on what I knew 
and what I was asked at that time, with those 
open ulcerations, my opinion would have 
changed.” (Abeles Dep. 112:21-113:6.)
It is important to note that Verizon 
disavows any role in selecting Dr. Abeles or 
shaping his conclusion in 2007. Additionally, 
the Court recognizes that the decision makers 
at Verizon only had before them Dr. Abeles’s 
original conclusion—namely, that plaintiff 
could work—when they fired plaintiff. 
However, the circumstances surrounding this 
examination and the information supplied to 
Dr. Abeles—including the fact that Abeles 
was not familiar with sickle cell anemia at the 
time he examined plaintiff, his 180 degree 
change in opinion during his deposition, the 
limited scope of the MetLife medical 
director’s investigation, and the fact that 
Verizon concluded that Casseus had 
misrepresented his health status even though 
the relevant decision makers were unaware of 
a key fact regarding Casseus’s health, i.e., that 
he had sickle cell anemia— create issues of 
disputed fact in light of the entire record 
regarding Verizon’s precise role in Abeles’s 
initial assessment and whether the proffered 
reason for terminating plaintiff was pretextual.
Finally, the surveillance video, which is 
Verizon’s key piece of evidence in this 
lawsuit, does not support summary judgment
in Verizon’s favor in light of the entire record. 
First, the video covers a small part of 
Casseus’s leave—roughly two two-hour 
periods during approximately 35 hours of 
surveillance on plaintiff’s home. (See Brener 
Decl. Ex. N.) During the other periods of 
surveillance, plaintiff was not observed 
outside the home. (See id.) Additionally, 
although plaintiff is observed walking and 
standing in the video, the Attending Physician 
Statement indicated, as noted above, that he 
could walk and stand for between one and two 
hours at a time. Furthermore, although the 
Attending Physician Statement also indicated 
plaintiff was unable to drive or bend, again, 
there is no evidence plaintiff was aware that 
the Attending Physician Statement said this. 
Finally, aspects of the video are consistent 
with the representations made by plaintiff. 
For example, plaintiff is seen wearing—in 
December— flip flops and tube socks which is 
consistent with the statement in the FMLA 
Certification Form that “closed shoe gear non- 
tolerated.” (See Brener Decl. Ex. H.)
Additionally, plaintiff limps and uses a cane at 
points in the video. (See id. Ex. O.)
As noted earlier, numerous courts have 
held that an employer’s belief that an 
employee engaged in misconduct need not be 
correct, only honestly held. See, e.g., Worster 
v. Carlson Wagonlit Travel,No. 3:02-CV-167 
EBB, 2005 WL 1595596, at *2 (D. Conn. July 
6, 2005) (“[A]n employer who honestly 
believes that it is terminating an employee 
who obtained FMLA leave fraudulently will 
not be liable even if  the employer is mistaken 
in its belief.”); LeBoeuf v. N.Y. Univ. Med. 
Ctr., No. 98 Civ. 0973 (JSM), 2000 WL 
1863762, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2000) 
(“Where an employee is terminated because 
the employer honestly believed that the 
employee was not using the leave period for 
its ‘intended purpose,’ an FMLA claim will
13
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not lie.”). In this case, however, viewing the 
record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, 
there are genuine issues of disputed fact that 
preclude summary judgment on the issue of 
whether Verizon acted in bad faith in 
interpreting plaintiff’s actions (and his 
doctor’s representations) and, accordingly, 
whether its proffered non-discriminatory 
reason should be rejected.
This Court’s determination on this issue is 
consistent with decisions by courts in other 
jurisdictions analyzing FMLA claims. For 
example, in Nelson v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., 
No. 07-C-509, 2008 WL 4379557, at *2-3 
(E.D. Wis. Sept. 23, 2008), the employer 
terminated the plaintiff after reviewing 
surveillance video showing plaintiff driving 
her car and shopping on two different dates, 
which the employer viewed as inconsistent 
with her doctor’s claim that she was unable to 
work. In denying the employer’s motion for 
summary judgment, the court explained:
It may be true that a jury will 
ultimately conclude that the decision 
to terminate [plaintiff’s] employment 
was based on an honest suspicion that 
she was abusing her leave. But the 
evidence bearing on the issue is not so 
one-sided as to warrant summary 
judgment . . . . This is not to say that 
[the employer’s] initial decision to 
conduct surveillance and its request 
for clarification from [the doctor] were 
unreasonable. The FMLA does not 
require an employer to ignore human 
nature and assume that each of its 
employees always tells the truth. 
Given the sudden manner in which the 
request for leave arose, the lack of 
specific information about the nature 
o f the condition that required it, and 
[plaintiff’s] healthy appearance and
behavior, [the manager’s] suspicions 
were understandable. And the fact 
that the surveillance report revealed 
that [plaintiff] had engaged in 
activities while on leave that were 
inconsistent with the severe functional 
limitations set forth in [the doctor’s] 
initial certification certainly justified 
further action on [the employer’s] part.
If neither [plaintiff] nor her physician 
had offered any explanation o f the 
appar en t  i ncons i s t ency ,  [the 
employer’s] decision to terminate 
[plaintiff’s] employment would have 
been entirely justified.
Id. at *5. The court then further explained 
that, based upon the additional evidence 
offered by plaintiff to the employer to explain 
why the activities were not inconsistent with 
the limitations her doctor had placed upon her, 
“a jury could conclude that [the employer’s] 
decision to terminate her employment was not 
based on an honest belief that she had abused 
her leave” and that the employer “simply saw 
an opportunity to get rid of an employee with 
a chronic mental illness whom it regarded as 
unreliable.” Id. at 6.
Similarly, in Weimer v. Honda o f America 
Manufacturing, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-844, 2008 
WL 2421648, at *6 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 
2008), the court denied the employer’s motion 
for summary judgment on FMLA claim, 
despite video of plaintiff installing a porch 
while on leave. Specifically, the Court noted:
[T]he Court cannot say whether the 
work Plaintiff apparently performed 
on this porch demonstrated that he 
could perform the essential tasks of 
his j ob. He may or may not have been 
able to perform the vigorous work to a 
level that still fell short o f the
14
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demands of his job. If the latter is 
true, then Plaintiff may have indeed 
been using his FMLA leave for its 
intended purpose even while engaging 
in the less demanding activity of 
working on this porch.
Id. at *5. Thus, the court concluded that “if 
Defendant knew that Plaintiff’s purported on- 
leave activities did not rise to the level of his 
job functions, then regardless of whether the 
investigation is mistaken or correct as to his 
on-leave activities, the investigation’s 
conclusions cannot provide the honest belief 
on which Defendant relies.” Id. at *6; see 
also Smith v. Southern Ill. Riverboat/Casino 
Cruises, Inc., No. 06-cv-4069, 2007 WL 
1805597, at *5 (S.D. Ill. June 21, 2007) 
(denying employer’s motion for summary 
judgment on FMLA claim, despite 
surveillance evidence of plaintiff on vacation 
while on leave, because the fact that plaintiff 
“went on vacation does not, in itself, suggest 
that her limitations were such that she could 
work”). See generally Moran v. Redford 
Union Sch. Dist., Civil Action No. 08-CV- 
15215, 2009 WL 5217681, at *14 (E.D. Mich. 
Dec. 29, 2009) (noting that “a jury could 
conclude that Plaintiff [by traveling to 
Florida] did not engage in any activities that 
are inconsistent with her medical leave” and 
distinguishing other cases where a plaintiff 
was “caught ‘red-handed’ performing 
activities while on their FMLA leave that were 
plainly inconsistent with their respective 
medical leaves” because, in such cases, “it 
would have been impossible for any jury to 
conclude, in light of the surveillance 
conducted by the respective private 
investigators, that the respective plaintiffs 
were not misusing their FMLA leave”).
As in Nelson and Weimer, the videotaped 
surveillance evidence of plaintiff in the instant
case is not necessarily of the “smoking gun” 
nature that defendant attempts to portray to the 
Court. A rational jury could, when viewing 
that videotape in light of the entire record, 
conclude that plaintiff was not able to work 
while on leave, notwithstanding his activities 
on the two days in the video. In fact, Dr. 
Abeles testified in his deposition that, 
notwithstanding the video, he now would 
reach a different conclusion regarding 
plaintiff’s ability to work while on leave. 
Thus, reasonable minds can clearly disagree 
on the weight that should be given to that 
videotape. Moreover, if  all of the other 
disputed factual issues in the record (and all 
reasonable inferences from the evidence) are 
resolved in plaintiff’s favor, a rational jury 
may conclude that defendant’s proffered 
reason regarding plaintiff’s abuse of leave was 
not only erroneous, but that it was not 
honestly held and was pretextual.
In sum, although defendant has offered 
evidence to undermine plaintiff’s FMLA 
claims in this lawsuit, there are sufficient 
issues of disputed fact, including credibility 
determinations that must be made, to require 
these claims to be decided by a jury. Thus, 
summary judgment in defendant’s favor is 
unwarranted.
b. Plaintiff’s Motion
Plaintiff cross-moves for summary 
judgment on the FMLA claims. However, 
the same disputed facts that preclude summary 
judgment in defendant’s favor also require 
that plaintiff’s motion be denied. In 
particular, construing the evidence most 
f avorab ly  to defendant ,  there is 
evidence—much of which is described 
above— from which a rational jury could find 
that plaintiff misrepresented his health status, 
and/or that Verizon honestly believed that
15
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plaintiff misrepresented his health status, and 
that Verizon did not interfere with plaintiff’s 
FMLA leave or retaliate against him by 
cutting his FMLA leave short and ultimately 
firing him. Accordingly, plaintiff’s cross­
motion for summary judgment is denied.
B. Race Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff also asserts that Verizon 
discriminated against him on the basis of his 
race in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, etseq. and the 
New York State Human Rights Law 
(“NYSHRL”). Verizon has moved for 
summary judgement on this claim. As set 
forth below, plaintiff has failed to set forth 
evidence that raises a genuine issue of fact on 
the race discrimination claims, and, thus, 
summary judgment in defendant’s favor on 
these claims is warranted.
Because plaintiff presents no direct 
evidence of discriminatory treatment based on 
his race, the McDonnell-Douglas standard 
described above is again applicable. To 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination 
under Title VII, a plaintiff must show “ ‘(1) 
that he belonged to a protected class; (2) that 
he was qualified for the position he held; (3) 
that he suffered an adverse employment 
action; and (4) that the adverse employment 
action occurred under circumstances giving 
rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.’” 
Sassaman v. Gamanche, 566 F.3d 307, 312 
(2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Holcomb v. Iona 
Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 2008)). The 
Second Circuit has characterized the evidence 
necessary for the plaintiff to satisfy this initial 
burden as “minimal” and “de minimis.” See 
Zimmermann v. Assocs. First Capital Corp., 
251 F.3d 376, 381 (2d Cir. 2001).
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
“ ‘ a r t i c u l a t e  s o m e  l e g i t i m a t e ,  
nond i sc r imina to ry  reason for t h e ’ 
termination.” Patterson v. County o f Oneida, 
375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting 
O ’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 
517 U.S. 308, 311 (1996)). If the defendant 
carries that burden, “the burden shifts back to 
the plaintiff to demonstrate by competent 
evidence that ‘the legitimate reasons offered 
by the defendant were not its true reasons, but 
were a pretext for discrimination.’” 
Patterson, 375 F.3d at 221 (quoting Texas 
Dep’t o f Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
248, 253 (1981)). “‘The ultimate burden of 
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant 
intentionally discriminated against the 
plaintiff remains at all times with the 
plaintiff.’” Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
253).
To meet this burden, the plaintiff may rely 
on evidence presented to establish her prima 
facie case as well as additional evidence. 
Such additional evidence may include direct 
or circumstantial evidence of discrimination. 
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 
99-101 (2003). It is not sufficient, however, 
for a plaintiff merely to show that she satisfies 
“McDonnell Douglas’s minimal requirements 
of a prima facie case” and to put forward 
“evidence from which a factfinder could find 
that the employer’s explanation . . . was 
false.” James v. N.Y. RacingAss’n, 233 F.3d 
149, 153 (2d Cir. 2000). Instead, the key 
inquiry is whether there is sufficient evidence 
in the record from which a reasonable trier of 
fact could find in favor of plaintiff on the 
ultimate issue, that is, whether the record 
contains sufficient evidence to support an 
inference of discrimination. See id. at 153-54; 
Connell v. Consol. Edison Co. o f N.Y., Inc., 
109 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207-08 (S.D.N.Y.
16
Case 2:08-cv-04119-JFB-WDW Document 32 Filed 07/09/10 Page 17 of 27 PagelD #:
<pageID>
2000).13
Here, Casseus has provided no evidence 
from which a jury could infer racial 
discrimination, even if  the jury rejected 
V erizon’s proffered non-discriminatory reason 
for its actions. The complaint contains only a 
conclusory assertion that Casseus was 
terminated on the basis of race. (Compl. ^ 
68.) In his deposition, Casseus asserted that 
he believed racial discrimination occurred 
because he had sickle cell anemia and sickle 
cell anemia disproportionately affects African 
Americans. (See P l.’s Dep. 243:3-9.)
However, again, nothing in this assertion even 
remotely suggests that Verizon intentionally 
discriminated against plaintiff on the basis of 
race.
Now, in his opposition brief to Verizon’s 
summary judgment motion, Casseus raises a 
new theory of Title VII liability—that Verizon 
“waited substantially longer to conduct 
surveillance on white people” than on 
Casseus. Plaintiff also provides examples of 
allegedly similarly situated white employees. 
(Pl.’s Opp. at 25-26.)
This new allegation does not enable 
Casseus’s race discrimination claim to survive 
summary judgment. As a threshold matter, 
courts generally do not consider claims or 
completely new theories of liability asserted 
for the first time in opposition to summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Lyman v. CSX Transp., 
Inc., No. 09-2548-cv, 2010 WL 445613, at *2 
(2d Cir. Feb. 8, 2010) (affirming district 
court’s determination that it should not
13 The same analysis applies to plaintiff’s race 
discrimination claim under the New York State 
Human Rights Law. See Weinstock v. Columbia 
Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 n.1 (2d Cir. 2000).
consider claims raised for the first time in 
opposition to summary judgment (citing 
Greenidge v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 F.3d 356, 
361 (2d Cir. 2006) and Syracuse Broad. Corp. 
v. Newhouse, 236 F.2d 522, 525 (2d
Cir.1956))); Brandon v. City o f N .Y .,-----F.
Supp. 2d - - -, No. 07 Civ. 8789 (LAP), 2010 
WL 1375207, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 
2010) (“It is black letter law that a party may 
not raise new claims for the first time in 
opposition to summaryjudgment.”); Heletsi v. 
Lufthansa German Airlines, Inc., No. 
99CV4793(SJ), 2001 WL 1646518, at *1 n.1 
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 18, 2001) (“A party cannot 
amend their complaint simply by alleging new 
facts and theories in their memoranda 
opposing summary judgment.”); see also 5 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1183 n. 9 
(“An opposition to a summary judgment 
motion is not the place for a plaintiff to raise 
new claims.”). Accordingly, defendant is 
entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff’s 
Title VII claim on this basis alone.
However, in any event, the Court also 
concludes that the race discrimination claims 
fail on the merits. Specifically, even 
considering the new allegations raised in 
plaintiff’s opposition, plaintiff’s Title VII 
claim would fail as a matter of law because he 
has not demonstrated an adverse employment 
action. “An adverse employment action is a 
‘materially adverse change in the terms and 
conditions of employment.’” Mathirampuzha 
v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 78 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Sanders v. N.Y. City Human Res. 
Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
The surveillance, which occurred while 
plaintiff was on leave and which plaintiff was 
apparently unaware of until he returned to 
work, did not directly affect the terms and 
conditions of plaintiff’s employment. 
Therefore, even considering plaintiff’s new
17
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theory of race discrimination, plaintiff has 
failed to establish a prima facie case.
In sum, given the complete lack of 
evidence from which a rational jury could find 
that the defendant’s termination decision was 
motivated by race, the Court grants 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment on 
plaintiff’s race discrimination claims.
C. Disability Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff also asserts disability claims 
under the ADA and the NYSHRL. As set 
forth below, plaintiff’s own evidence 
demonstrates that the manifestations of his 
illness are episodic and not consistently 
severe. Thus, plaintiff’s own evidence 
demonstrates that his impairment cannot, as a 
matter of law, constitute a disability within the 
meaning of the ADA under the particular 
circumstances of this case. However, 
plaintiff’s evidence, if  credited, would satisfy 
the broader definition of disability under the 
NYSHRL. Moreover, plaintiff has submitted 
sufficient evidence to create material issues of 
fact that survive summary judgment on the 
other elements of a disability discrimination 
claim under the NYSHRL. Thus, although the 
Court grants summary judgment on the ADA 
claim, it denies summary judgment on the 
NYSHRL claim.
1. ADA
Casseus brings claims under the ADA for 
both “failure to accommodate” (Compl. ^ 57) 
and for discriminatory adverse employment 
action on the basis of his disability. (Compl. 
m  56, 58.)
a. Applicable Law
The ADA prohibits discrimination against
a “qualified individual on the basis of 
disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).14 To
14 Congress recently enacted the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), effective 
January 1, 2009, which expanded the class of 
individuals entitled to protection under the ADA. 
However, this Court and other courts— including 
the Second Circuit in at least three summary 
orders—have indicated that the ADAAA does not 
apply to conduct that occurred prior to the 
effective date of the statute. See, e.g., Ragusa v. 
Malverne Union Free Sch. Dist., No. 08-5367­
2010 WL 2490966, at *1 n.2 (2d Cir. June 21, 
2010) (summary order) (“[W]e here apply the 
version of the [ADA] in effect during the time 
period at issue, which ended with [plaintiff’s] 
termination on June 30, 2005.”); Rogers v. City o f  
N.Y., 359 F. App’x 201, 203 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Cody v. County o f Nassau, 345 F. App’x 717, 720 
(2d Cir. 2009) (“[I]t is unlikely that the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 . . . applies to conduct 
that occurred before the A ct’s effective date of 
January 1, 2009. We need not decide the 
retroactivity issue . . . .”); Schroeder v. Suffolk 
County Cmty. Coll., No. 07-CV-2060 (JFB) 
(WDW), 2009 WL 1748869, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 
22, 2009) (collecting cases); see also White v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 07 Civ. 4286 (NGG) 
(MDG), 2009 WL 1140434, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 
27, 2009) (“The court therefore . . . concludes that 
the [ADAAA] should not apply to this case. This 
is consistent with the conclusions of other courts 
in this circuit that the 2008 Amendments do not 
apply to conduct prior to the effective date of the 
amended statute.” (collecting cases)); Moran v. 
Premier Educ. Group, LP, 599 F. Supp. 2d 263, 
271-72 (D. Conn. 2009) (“ [I]t appears that every 
court that has addressed this issue, which includes 
a number of federal district courts and at least one 
federal appeals court, has concluded that the 2008 
Amendments cannot be applied retroactively to 
conduct that preceded its effective date.” 
(collecting cases)). Thus, the Court will evaluate 
plaintiff’s evidence within the legal framework in 
place at the time of plaintiff’s termination, June 1, 
2007, and not under the ADAAA.
18
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succeed on an ADA claim, a plaintiff must 
prove that “‘(1) the defendant is covered by 
the ADA; (2) plaintiff suffers from or is 
regarded as suffering from a disability within 
the meaning of the ADA; (3) plaintiff was 
qualified to perform the essential functions o f 
the job, with or without reasonable 
accommodation; and (4) plaintiff suffered an 
adverse employment action because o f his 
disability or perceived disability.’” Kinneary 
v. City o f N.Y., 601 F.3d 151, 155-56 (2d Cir. 
2010) (quoting Capobianco v. City o f N.Y., 
422 F.3d 47, 56 (2d. Cir. 2005)).
“Discrimination under the ADA includes 
‘not making reasonable accommodations to 
the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability 
who is an applicant or employee, unless such 
covered entity can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation o f the business of 
such covered entity.’” Brady v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
In this case, plaintiff alleges that Verizon 
violated the ADA by (1) interfering with his 
leave and denying him leave because he was 
disabled; (2) failing to provide a reasonable 
accommodation after ordering him to return to 
work; and (3) firing him because he was 
disabled. (See Compl. 56-58.)
To succeed on any of his ADA theories of 
liability, plaintiff must demonstrate that he is 
an individual with a disability. The ADA 
defines “disability” as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of such 
individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).15
b. Application
Casseus argues that he falls within 
categories (A) and (B) o f the above-referenced 
ADA definition o f disability. As set forth 
below, the Court disagrees and concludes that 
the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates, as 
a matter o f law, that plaintiff’s impairment 
cannot meet the ADA definition o f disability.
(1) Substantially Limited in a Major Life 
Activity
To determine whether an individual fits 
into the first category, i.e., that the individual 
has a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits a major life activity, the 
Second Circuit has “applied the three-step 
approach taken by the Supreme Court in 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 
2196, 141 L.Ed.2d 540 (1998).” Weixel v. 
Board o f Educ. o f City o f New York, 287 F.3d 
138, 147 (2d Cir. 2002). Under this approach,
plaintiff must first show that she 
suffers from a physical or mental 
impairment. Second, plaintiff must 
identify the activity claimed to be 
impaired and establish that it 
constitutes a “major life activity.”
19
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at 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).
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Third, the plaintiff must show that her 
impairment “substantially limits” the 
m ajor life activity previously 
identified. In addition, the Supreme 
Court has recently clarified that the 
identified major life activity must be 
“of central importance to daily life. 
Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 
U.S. 184 (2002).
Weixel, 287 F.3d at 147 (internal citations 
omitted).
Here, Verizon does not dispute that sickle 
cell anemia is a “physical impairment.” 
Verizon does argue, however, that plaintiff 
has not shown that he is substantially limited 
in a major life activity.
The term “major life activity” includes 
“functions such as caring for oneself, 
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). This, 
however, is not an exclusive list, and the 
Second Circuit has also included “‘sitting, 
standing, lifting, and reaching’” as major life 
activities. Ryan v. Grae & Rybicki, 135 F.3d 
867, 870 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, 
Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook, I- 
27 (1992)).16
Under applicable EEOC regulations, “[t]he 
following factors should be considered in 
determining whether someone is substantially
16 The ADAAA codifies all of these activities, 
except sitting and reaching, as “major life 
activities.” Additionally, the ADAAA includes 
concentrating, reading, bending, eating, sleeping, 
thinking, communicating, and “major bodily 
functions” as major life activities. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12102(2) (as amended Jan. 1, 2009).
limited in a major life activity”:
(i) The nature and severity of the 
impairment;
(ii) The duration or expected duration 
of the impairment; and
(iii) The permanent or long term 
impact, or the expected permanent or 
long term impact of or resulting from 
the impairment.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2Q(2). Although these 
EEOC regulations do not bind courts, they do 
provide courts “with guidance” in interpreting 
the ADA. See Ryan, 135 F.3d at 870.
In any event, a plaintiff will not be 
“substantially limited” in a major life activity 
if  the impairment in question causes only 
episodic or temporary restrictions. In Ryan, 
for example, the plaintiff suffered from 
ulcerative colitis of the rectum. A symptom of 
this condition, which was incurable, was that 
the plaintiff would periodically be constipated 
for three to four days and then have 
uncontrollable and painful diarrhea for another 
three to four days. After being fired by her 
employer, the plaintiff filed suit under the 
ADA. She argued, inter alia, that she was 
substantially limited in the major life activities 
of “control[ing] the elimination of waste” and 
caring for herself. The district court granted 
the employer summary judgment, and the 
Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the 
plaintiff had not shown she was substantially 
limited in a major life activity. 135 F.3d at 
871-72. The court recognized that the 
plaintiff’s colitis was a severe impairment 
when it was symptomatic and that it would 
affect the plaintiff for the rest of her life. 
However, the plaintiff acknowledged that she 
could go years without experiencing
20
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symptoms of her colitis and that her colitis 
symptoms varied in intensity and generally 
occurred only in the summer months. Thus, 
the duration of the impairment and the 
expected long-term impact of the impairment 
weighed against finding that the plaintiff was 
substantially limited. Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had not 
shown she was limited in the major life 
activities o f “control[ing] the elimination of 
waste” and caring for herself. Id.
Since the Second Circuit decided Ryan, 
other courts have held that a plaintiff is not 
substantially limited in a major life activity 
because of a condition that causes intermittent 
restrictions on the person, even when those 
restrictions are severe. See, e.g., Waldrip v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 325 F.3d 652, 656-57 (5th Cir. 
2003) (finding that plaintiff had not shown 
that chronic pancreatitis, a “painful” condition 
that “can cause bleeding, pancreatic necrosis 
(tissue death), or even pancreatic cancer,” 
substantially limited him in the major life 
activity of eating where doctor testified that 
“at most, he occasionally must miss a few 
days of work when his chronic pancreatitis 
flares up”); EEOC v. Sara Lee, Inc., 237 F.3d 
349, 352 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that “[t]o 
hold that a person is disabled whenever that 
individual suffers from an occasional 
manifestation of an illness would expand the 
contours of the ADA beyond all bounds” and 
finding that plaintiff who periodically 
experienced seizures caused by epilepsy was 
not substantially limited in major life activities 
of sleeping, thinking, or caring for herself); 
Tojzan v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp., No. 00 
Civ. 6105(WHP), 2003 WL 1738993, at *8 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,2003) (“Since [plaintiff’s] 
physical impairments are episodic and are not 
consistently severe, they do not substantially 
limit a major life activity. Thus, [plaintiff] is 
not disabled within the meaning of the ADA
and consequently cannot establish a prima 
facie case of disability discrimination.”); Irby 
v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., No. 99 CIV. 
2172(VM), 2000 WL 1634413, at *2 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000) (finding plaintiff 
who alleged that symptoms of polycystic 
kidney and polycystic liver disease caused her 
to miss work at least two to three days each 
month was not substantially limited in any 
major life activity), aff’d, 262 F.3d 412 (2d 
Cir. 2001).17
Similarly here, even viewing the facts in a 
light most favorable to Casseus, no reasonable 
jury could find that the ulcers and wounds 
caused by Casseus’s sickle cell anemia 
substantially limit Casseus in any major life 
activity. According to the declaration of one 
of Casseus’s physicians, Dr. Greta Rainsford, 
plaintiff’s vascular crises can be severe and, at 
times, make it extremely painful to bend, 
drive, walk, or stand. (Rainsford Decl. ^  14, 
17.) Not every vascular crisis experienced by 
plaintiff is this severe, however, and, even 
during a particular crisis, plaintiff’s symptoms 
vary greatly in intensity. (See id. fflf 17-18.) 
Moreover, Dr. Rainsford indicates that the 
crises are relatively infrequent and that 
plaintiff is able to function without substantial 
limitation most of the time:
17 The Court notes that this requirement has been 
modified by the enactment of the ADAAA. In 
particular, the ADAAA expressly provides that 
“[a]n impairment that is episodic or in remission 
is a disability if it would substantially limit a 
major life activity when active.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(4)(D). However, as noted above, the 
ADAAA does not have retroactive effect, and the 
version of the ADA in existence when Verizon 
fired plaintiff did not include this language. Thus, 
the new ADAAA standard is inapplicable to this 
case.
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From 2000 to 2006, Paul had two 
instances where deep ulcers and 
wounds developed on his ankles. The 
crises usually come about when the 
ulcers and wounds m anifested] 
themselves. During this time period, 
when Paul did not have ulcers and 
wounds, he could for the most part 
perform activities of daily living 
which included working at Verizon.
(Id. ^ 19.) Thus, like the plaintiff in Ryan, 
although Casseus’s sickle cell anemia is 
apparently permanent, “it is asymptomatic for 
long periods,” its symptoms “var[y] in 
intensity,” and Casseus “can go for years 
without significant symptoms.” 135 F.3d at 
871. Accordingly, although the vascular 
crises resulting from sickle cell anemia may, 
at times, limit Casseus’s ability to, among 
other things, work and walk, no reasonable 
jury could find that Casseus is substantially 
limited in any major life activity as defined 
under the ADA.
(2) Record of Such an Impairment
The Court also concludes that Casseus 
cannot, as a matter of law, show that he has a 
“record of” a disability. To establish that he 
fits within this prong of the definition of 
disability, Casseus must show that Verizon 
had a record of him as having “an impairment 
that would substantially limit one or more of 
[his] major life activities.’” McCowan v. 
HSBC Bank, 689 F. Supp. 2d 390, 405 
(E.D.N.Y 2010). Here, although there is 
evidence in the record that Verizon knew that 
Cassseus had sickle cell anemia, there is no 
evidence from which a jury could find that 
Verizon had a record indicating that Casseus 
was substantially limited in any major life
activity for the reasons discussed supra.18
18 V erizon apparently lost plaintiff’s personnel file 
when the office where plaintiff worked was 
relocated to Great River, NY. (See Pl.’s Reply 
Mem. of Law Ex. A.) Plaintiff argues that, 
because Verizon lost the personnel file, an 
adverse inference should arise and establish that 
he has a record of disability. (See Pl.’s Reply 
Mem. of Law at 6-7.) The Court disagrees. It is 
true that “[i]n borderline cases, an inference of 
spoliation, in combination with ‘some (not 
insubstantial) evidence’ for the p laintiff’s cause 
of action, can allow the plaintiff to survive 
summary judgment.” Byrnie v. Town o f  
Cromwell, Bd. o f  Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 
2001) (quoting Kronisch v. United States, 150 
F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir.1998)). A spoliation 
inference is available if: (1) relevant evidence is 
destroyed; (2) with culpability; (3) when the 
defendant was under a duty to preserve the 
evidence. See id. at 108-09. Even if  the Court 
considered this argument, which is raised for the 
first time in plaintiff’s reply memorandum of law 
and not in a separate motion, plaintiff would not 
survive (or be entitled to) summary judgment. 
First, plaintiff cannot show that the personnel file 
was relevant to his “record of” disability theory 
and, thus, even assuming Verizon violated a duty 
to preserve plaintiff’s personnel file and destroyed 
the personnel file with culpability, plaintiff cannot 
meet the requirements for an inference of 
spoliation. “Relevant” in this context “ ‘means 
something more than sufficiently probative to 
satisfy Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
Rather, the party seeking an adverse inference 
must adduce sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable trier of fact could infer that the 
destroyed or unavailable evidence would have 
been of the nature alleged by the party affected by 
its destruction.’” Scalera v. Electrograph Sys., 
Inc., 262 F.R.D. 162, 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge 
Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 108-09 (2d Cir. 2002). 
Relevance may be established by (1) a showing 
that the party responsible for the evidence’s 
destruction acted with a sufficiently culpable state
22
Case 2:08-cv-04119-JFB-WDW Document 32 Filed 07/09/10 Page 23 of 27 PagelD #:
<pageID>
of mind or (2) extrinsic evidence showing that the 
missing evidence would have been favorable to 
the moving party. See id. Here, Casseus has not 
presented any extrinsic evidence to support an 
argument that Verizon had a record that Casseus 
was disabled, and the Court will not infer 
otherwise. As explained above, statements from 
Casseus himself and the physician who has treated 
him for over 30 years establish that Casseus is not 
an individual with a disability under the ADA. 
Thus, there is simply no basis to believe that 
Casseus’s personnel file contained some record 
that Casseus was disabled when his testimony and 
his doctor’s affidavit demonstrate that he is not 
disabled. Second, even if  Casseus did meet the 
requirements for an adverse spoliation inference, 
he has not made the additional further showing of 
“(not insubstantial) evidence” to survive summary 
judgment. See Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 107. Again, 
there is no basis to infer that Verizon had a record 
of Casseus being disabled. As such, even if 
Casseus established spoliation, his “record of” 
disability theory would not survive summary 
judgment. Spiegel v. Adirondack Park Agency, 
662 F. Supp. 2d 243, 257 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Even 
were the elements of spoliation satisfied, the 
sanction of permitting the [plainitffs] to survive 
summary judgment on the element of malice in 
their selective prosecution claim would be 
inappropriate . . . [because t]he evidence of malice 
is insubstantial at best.”); Liburd v. Bronx 
Lebanon Hosp. Ctr., No. 07 Civ. 11316 (HB), 
2009 WL 900739, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2009) 
(finding that plaintiff’s spoliation claim was 
“insufficient to save her from summary judgment” 
because plaintiff had “produced no evidence 
whatsoever” that destroyed records were 
favorable to her); Hamilton v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 
528 F. Supp. 2d 431, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(“‘[T]he destruction of evidence, standing alone, 
is [not] enough to allow a party who has produced 
no evidence— or utterly inadequate evidence— in 
support of a given claim to survive summary 
judgment on that claim.’” (quoting Kronisch, 150 
F.3d at 128 (second alteration in original))).
Therefore, no reasonable jury could find 
that Casseus was an “individual with a 
disability.” As such, he has failed to establish 
a prima facie case on any of his ADA theories. 
Therefore, Verizon is entitled to summary 
judgment on those claims, and Casseus’s 
motion for summary judgment on the ADA 
claims is denied.19
2. NYSHRL
The definition of “disability” is broader 
under the NYSHRL than it is under the ADA. 
See State Div. o f Human Rights v. Xerox 
Corp, 480 N.E.2d 695, 698 (N.Y. 1985); 
Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 
140 F.3d 144, 155 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Regardless 
of the [fact that the] legislative history of the 
[NYSHRL indicates] that the statutory 
definition of disability was intended to be 
coextensive with that of the federal disability 
statutes, we are bound by the construction of 
the statute propounded by the state’s highest 
court.”). Under New York law, the term 
“disability” is not limited to physical or 
mental impairments but “may also include 
‘medical’ impairments. In addition, to qualify 
as a disability, the condition may manifest 
itself in one of two ways: (1) by preventing 
the exercise of a normal bodily function or (2) 
by being demonstrable by medically accepted 
clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.”
19 The Court’s determination that Casseus does 
not have a “disability” as defined under the ADA 
does not affect the issue of whether Casseus had 
a “serious health condition” so as to qualify for 
FMLA leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.702(b) (stating 
the “ADA’s ‘disability’ and FMLA’s ‘serious 
health condition’ are different concepts, and must 
be analyzed separately”).
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Xerox Corp., 480 N.E.2d at 698 (internal 
quotation omitted); see also N.Y. Exec. Law 
§ 292(21) (“The term ‘disability’ means . . . a 
physical, mental or medical impairment 
resulting from anatomical, physiological, 
genetic or neurological conditions which 
prevents the exercise of a normal bodily 
function or is demonstrable by medically 
accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic 
techniques . . . .”). Thus, under state law, a 
disability need only be a demonstrable 
impairment; it does not have to substantially 
limit a major life activity. See Reeves, 140 
F.3d at 154; see, e.g., Krikelis v. Vassar Coll., 
581 F. Supp. 2d 476, 486 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(finding that employee who suffered from 
diabetes was not substantially limited in a 
major life activity under the ADA but that 
triable issues of fact existed as to whether 
plaintiff had a cognizable disability under the 
NYSHRL).
Neither party directly addresses the 
applicability of the NYSHRL’s definition of a 
disability here. Nonetheless, a reasonable jury 
could determine that plaintiff’s sickle cell 
anemia and associated vascular crises are a 
physical or medical impairment and, as such, 
are a “disability” under New York law.
Additionally, construing the evidence most 
favorably to plaintiff, a rational jury could find 
that plaintiff has established the other 
elements of a disability discrimination claim 
under the NYSHRL. Unlike the analysis for 
the “disability” element, the analysis for these 
other elements is identical to the analysis 
under the ADA. Primmer v. CBS Studios, 
Inc., 667 F. Supp. 2d 248, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (“The only major difference in the 
analysis of disability discrimination under the 
state and city statutes as compared to the ADA 
is that the definition of disability under the 
former is considerably broader than the ADA
definition, at least before the amendments of 
2008.”); see also, e.g., Krikelis, 581 F. Supp. 
2d at 486 (“The NYHRL ‘reasonable 
accommodation’ requirement parallels that 
imposed by the ADA, and so the Court 
appropriately looks to the latter for guidance.” 
(citing Lovejoy-Wilson v. NOCO Motor Fuel, 
Inc., 263 F.3d 208, 212 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2001))).
Here, plaintiff has submitted evidence that 
raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether 
plaintiff should have been given an 
accommodation of additional leave in late 
January 2007 to allow his wounds to heal. Cf. 
Phillips v. City of N.Y., 884 N.Y.S.2d 369, 
375-76 (App. Div. 2009) (finding that one- 
year additional leave could be reasonable 
accommodation given circumstances of case). 
As defendant has correctly noted, plaintiff 
apparently did not expressly request an 
accommodation upon his return to work. 
However, the Second Circuit has held, in an 
ADA case, that while it is generally the 
employee’s responsibility to request an 
accommodation, “an employer has a duty [to] 
reasonably . . . accommodate an employee’s 
disability if  the disability is obvious-which is 
to say, if  the employer knew or reasonably 
should have known that the employee was 
disabled.” Brady v. Walmart Stores, 531 F.3d 
127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008). In such cases, the 
employer’s duty is to engage in an “interactive 
process” with the employee to determine if  the 
employee can be reasonably accommodated. 
Id. at 135-36. Viewed in a light most 
favorable to plaintiff, there is evidence that 
Verizon should have known that Casseus was 
still suffering from the effects of his vascular 
crisis when he returned to work in late January 
2007 but that Verizon nonetheless failed to 
engage in the required interactive process. 
Additionally, plaintiff suffered an adverse 
em ploym ent action, specifically  his 
termination, following his return to work. As
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discussed in the context of the FMLA claims, 
when the evidence is construed most 
favorably to plaintiff, there is evidence that his 
termination occurred because his medical 
impairment required him to miss work.20
20 Verizon also argues that plaintiff cannot 
establish a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination because Henke ultimately decided 
to fire plaintiff but was unaware plaintiff suffered 
from sickle cell anemia. However, John Scuteri 
testified that the decision to fire plaintiff “was a 
collaborative one, if  you will . . . [and that] . . .[i]t 
originated with labor.” (Scuteri Dep. 52:20-23.) 
Labor knew that plaintiff had sickle cell anemia 
and that he had wounds on his ankles. (See Melo- 
Papadakis Dep. 27:23-28:2, 62:18-63:5.) Thus, 
triable issues of fact exist as to who the relevant 
decisionmakers were and what they knew. 
Additionally, “under the so-called ‘cat’s paw’ 
theory of liability, ‘the impermissible bias of a 
single individual can infect the entire group of 
collective decisionmakers,’ . . . at least when the 
decisionmakers are overly deferential to the 
biased individual’s recommendations.” Baron v. 
N.Y. City Dep't o f  Educ., No. 06-CV-2816 
(FB)(MDG), 2009 WL 1938975, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009) (citing Fullardv. City o f N.Y., 274 F. Supp. 
2d 347, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) and quoting 
Jamieson v. Poughkeepsie City Sch. Dist., 195 F. 
Supp. 2d 457, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (internal 
quotation omitted)); see Bickerstaff v. Vassar 
Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 450 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We 
recognize that the impermissible bias of a single 
individual at any stage of the promoting process 
may taint the ultimate employment decision in 
violation of Title VII. This is true even absent 
evidence of illegitimate bias on the part of the 
ultimate decision maker, so long as the individual 
shown to have the impermissible bias played a 
meaningful role in the promotion process.” 
(internal citation omitted)); see also Sadki v. 
SUNY Coll. at Brockport, 310 F. Supp. 2d 506, 
515 n.5 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (endorsing the cat’s 
paw theory  o f em ployer liab ility  for 
discrimination and noting that “ [c]ertainly it
Although Verizon has proffered a non­
discrim inatory reason for p la in tiff’s 
termination, a rational jury could, for the 
reasons discussed in analyzing the FMLA 
claims, reject Verizon’s proffered reason as 
pretext and conclude that plaintiff was 
terminated based upon a disability within the 
meaning of the NYSHRL. Moreover, a 
rational jury could also reject plaintiff’s 
evidence and credit the proffered explanation 
of Verizon for its employment decision. As 
such, triable issues of fact exist with respect to 
plaintiff’s NYSHRL disability claim, and the 
Court denies the cross-motions for summary 
judgment on that claim.
IV. Co n clu sio n
For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants 
defendant’s motion for summary judgment in 
part and denies it in part. Specifically, the 
Court grants summary judgment on the race 
discrimination claims under federal and state 
law and on the ADA claim. The Court denies 
summary judgment on the FMLA claims and 
the NYSHRL disability claim. Finally, the 
Court denies plaintiff’s cross-motion for 
summary judgment in its entirety. The parties 
shall participate in a telephone conference on 
Tuesday, July 20, 2010 at 10:00 a.m. to 
schedule a trial date on the remaining claims. 
At that time, counsel for defendant shall 
initiate the call and, once all parties are on the
line, contact Chambers at (631) 712 5670.
would not be surprising if  a university president 
g ives  g re a t d e fe re n c e  to  a d e a n ’s 
recommendations for faculty positions, and the 
manner in which [the president] endorsed [the 
dean’s] recommendation— ‘I agree with your 
analysis. PY’— suggests that [the president] did 
so here.”).
25
Case 2:08-cv-04119-JFB-WDW Document 32 Filed 07/09/10 Page 26 of 27 PagelD #:
<pageID>
SO ORDERED.
JOSEPH F. BIANCO 
United States District Judge
Dated: July 9, 2010 
Central Islip, New York
* * *
Plaintiff is represented by Justin H. Reilly and 
Neil H. Greenberg, Law Offices of Neil H. 
Greenberg & Associates, 900 Merchants 
Concourse, Suite 314, Westbury, NY 11590. 
Defendant is represented by Martin Warren 
Aron of Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge 
LLP, 1 Giralda Farms, Madison, NJ 07940.
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